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ABSTRACT 
 The criminal justice system is susceptible to errors that can lead to wrongful 
conviction of innocent people, sometimes caused by faulty forensic evidence presented at 
trial. Among the problems is the fact that contextual information can bias forensic examiners 
to make “match” decisions when the materials are ambiguous (Dror, Peron, Hind, & 
Charlton, 2005; Dror, Charlton, & Peron, 2006). It is unlikely that contextual information 
could ever be eliminated from police investigations and the forensic examination procedure. 
Instead, the current experiment suggests that providing examiners with evidence lineups—
analogous to eyewitness identification lineups where the suspect is embedded among similar-
looking, known innocent fillers—can reduce the effect of contextual bias. This paper 
describes the first experiment conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of evidence 
lineups, called the filler-control procedure (Wells, Wilford, & Smalarz, 2013). Participants 
were trained and then examined eight sets of fingerprint materials. The materials were either 
more ambiguous or less ambiguous, and some of the sets had an actual match present and 
some did not. Furthermore, some participants received the filler-control procedure, and some 
the standard procedure—only one comparison print to compare to the crime print, as is 
standard in forensic examination procedures. The final manipulation was the presence or 
absence of related contextual information, in the form of a police case report suggesting that 
the suspect in the case is guilty. The results showed a contextual bias effect in the standard 
procedure when the materials were more ambiguous, but only when there was no actual 
fingerprint match present. So, the innocent suspect is in the most danger when the materials 
are degraded or difficult to compare, and the innocent suspect’s print is the only print 
presented to compare to the crime sample. The filler-control procedure, however, eliminated 
ix 
 
 
the effect of contextual information. Although the number of affirmative match decisions 
increased when using the filler-control method, these match decisions were spread across the 
lineup to the filler prints rather than loading onto the innocent suspect. These results mirror 
the results found in eyewitness identification, and show promise for use in the real world as a 
means to reduce wrongful conviction and improve forensic testing accuracy. 
Keywords: forensics, fingerprints, contextual bias, heuristics, lineups, filler-control 
method, evidence lineups. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
Lana Canen was charged with murder in 2004. The main evidence supporting her 
conviction was a latent fingerprint analysis matching her fingerprints to prints found at the 
crime scene. A local detective with minimal training in fingerprint examination performed 
the analysis and testified that her prints matched those found at the crime scene. This, 
combined with confession evidence from another man implicating her as his accomplice, 
lead to her eight-year imprisonment for a crime she did not commit. On appeal, the 
fingerprints were re-examined and it was discovered that they did not match—even the 
original examiner agreed that the prints did not match when the original examiner was 
allowed to re-analyze the prints (CBS News, 2012). How does a mistake like this occur? We 
know that the criminal justice system is fallible, but law enforcement professionals and the 
public view forensic science as reliable and credible. The Innocence Project (Innocence 
Project, 2016) has exonerated 330 people who were wrongfully convicted and, of these, 155 
have involved some form of forensic examination error. Furthermore, these numbers only 
represent the cases that have been found and resolved—the problem is likely much more 
prevalent (Charman, 2013). There is a need for a systematic investigation of forensic 
techniques and potential solutions to the errors seen in forensic examination.  
The Problem of Contextual Bias in Forensic Contexts 
The National Academy of Sciences (2009) released a report highlighting the need for 
more research into forensic examination error rates, their causes, and how to prevent error in 
forensic science. Of particular concern in the National Academy report was the impact of 
confirmation bias and contextual bias on forensic analysis, which the current study seeks to 
address. There is already some literature that speaks to the nature of contextual bias effects 
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and how they arise. To date, most of the empirical research seeking to find a solution to 
contextual bias has focused on finding the conditions under which contextual bias occurs, 
and then attempting to shield examiners from contextual information (Dror, Peron, Hind, & 
Charlton, 2005) or control when the contextual information is revealed (Dror et al., 2015; 
Dror, 2016). The current work, in contrast, assumes that it is almost impossible to fully shield 
forensic examiners from contextual information and therefore examines a method for 
neutralizing or diluting the impact of contextual information for a class of forensic tests that 
constitute “match” or “source” tests. In a match or source test, the examiner is typically 
presented with a crime scene sample (e.g., a latent fingerprint, fibers, shoeprint) and a 
suspect sample (prints from the suspect, fibers associated with the suspect, shoes of the 
suspect) and asked if the suspect sample was the source for the crime sample or if they 
“match.” The current study used fingerprints, but the same general principles and findings 
should apply to other source or match tests as well. 
How Contextual Information Influences Judgments 
So, what does the literature tell us about why contextual information might bias 
examiners to think that two fingerprints look alike when they are not? The answer lies in 
ordinary cognition and decision-making processes. When people make decisions, two kinds 
of cognitive processing are used. Bottom-up processing is a data-driven analysis where 
details of a stimulus are analyzed in a systematic way, without drawing on any other 
information (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). For example, fingerprint examiners use 
bottom-up processing when they analyze the pattern of ridges and pores in a fingerprint to 
compare to another fingerprint.  
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But bottom-up processing is most useful when the stimuli provided are unambiguous 
and there is sufficient time to undergo a detailed analysis of all the material available. As a 
result, people often rely on top-down processing or heuristics—making a judgment based the 
likelihood of each potential outcome when the resources available are inconclusive (Chaiken 
& Maheswaran, 1994; Saks, Risinger, Rosenthal, & Thompson, 2003). Lack of a clear 
answer is not the only reason why someone might start to rely on top-down processing, but 
these conditions will push people towards heuristic processing. One way heuristics can 
operate is by using prior knowledge, beliefs, or expectations to form a base-rate—an idea 
about the relative frequency of an outcome within a given set of circumstances (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). This kind of processing occurs in situations of uncertainty, when the 
available resources are limited, unclear, or there are time constraints, such as a rushed 
analysis of a partial fingerprint (Dror, et al., 2005; Neth & Gigerenzer, 2015).  
Heuristics can be most helpful in ambiguous situations and heuristics often lead to 
efficient and accurate decision-making for everyday situations (Neth & Gigerenzer, 2015). 
But, heuristics can also result in biased or erroneous decisions. For example, if the other 
information we draw on to help inform our judgment is inaccurate; our final decision might 
also be inaccurate. If people look for evidence to support an expected outcome and ignore the 
evidence against that outcome, our final decisions will be biased towards our expectations 
(confirmation and contextual bias; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Saks et al., 2003; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Contextual bias in a forensic setting can take on many forms, because 
there are many kinds of information that can be interpreted as incriminating. Maybe the 
examiner saw the crime described in the paper, with all the evidence against the suspect 
described in detail, or the examiner saw the press conference put together by the police on 
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television. What if the examiner overheard at the local hangout after work that the suspect 
tried to flee when they were approached initially for questioning? Or maybe the police officer 
that brings the evidence to the examiner is highly respected and is fairly sure “this is their 
guy”. 
To make this idea more concrete, think about the case of Lana Canen again. When the 
examiner performed the analysis of the fingerprints, he knew that another person had 
confessed and named her as his accomplice. So, the examiner probably did not begin the 
examination with a neutral starting point, open to being swayed equally by incriminating or 
exculpatory evidence. Rather, the examiner likely began the examination with the 
expectation that the prints would probably match, an expectation that could have been guided 
by the contextual information about the confession. Subsequently, he might have been more 
likely to look for aspects of the prints that confirmed his expectation, and ignore the aspects 
of the prints that disconfirmed. In addition, much more disconfirming evidence would have 
been required to override the examiner’s expectation that the prints should match once the 
examiner had formed the idea (Nickerson, 1998). Expectations can be formed by any number 
of different sources—police case reports, communication with police, and media can all 
change a fingerprint examiner’s view about the likelihood that a set of prints should match.  
This is problematic for the presentation of forensic evidence in court. Forensic 
experts are hired to testify about their analysis of the prints using the bottom-up process only. 
They are not hired to evaluate the credibility of a confession, the suspicions of the police 
investigator, a media slant, or interpret suspect behavior. These are all aspects of the case that 
will be analyzed and, if admissible, presented in court by people with that expertise, such as 
psychologists, police investigators, and interrogators. If the forensic analyst uses contextual 
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information available to them to inform their decision, their testimony in court may involve 
double counting of evidence or be based on inaccurate or inadmissible evidence. Of course, 
contextual information can be accurate information, so contextual information could help the 
examiner make a correct decision. Nevertheless, contextual information is not for the 
examiner to weigh; another expert or a direct witness should be the one to present contextual 
information in court if it is probative and admissible. Therefore, contextual information does 
not need to be, and should not be, allowed to influence the forensic examiner’s evaluation. 
So, we need to find a solution to the problem of contextual bias to protect the independence 
of forensic expert testimony at trial. 
Current Research Addressing Forensic Contextual Bias 
There is research demonstrating that contextual bias is a problem in forensic 
fingerprint examination, for ordinary people (Dror, Peron, Hind, & Charlton, 2005; Osborne 
& Zajac, 2016) and forensic experts (Dror, Charlton, & Peron, 2006). Other forensic 
materials have also been used, including handwriting (Kukucka & Kassin, 2014), bitemarks 
(Osborne et al., 2014), shoe impressions (Kerstholt, Paahuis, & Sjerps, 2007), and ballistics 
(Kerstholt et al., 2010). However, the results of studies using materials other than fingerprints 
have been mixed, maybe because forensic techniques with fewer known protocols are more 
difficult to manipulate in a way that is appropriate for empirical testing, and replicate with 
expert participants.  
Dror and colleagues (2005) created a paradigm for testing contextual bias in 
fingerprints with lay people. Participants were trained briefly to make fingerprint 
comparisons. Then, participants determined whether the fingerprints matched. Sometimes the 
fingerprints were ambiguous so whether they matched was very unclear, and sometimes the 
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fingerprints were clearer meaning that people could be more certain that they matched or did 
not match. In addition, sometimes participants made the decision with the help of additional, 
contextual information, and sometimes there was no extra information. There were four 
contextual information conditions: people received no context, photos with low emotion 
content (e.g. a hammer), photos with high emotional content (e.g. a bloody crime scene), and 
subliminal priming of emotional content paired with high emotion photos. Dror and 
colleagues found that participants made significantly more match decisions for pairs of 
fingerprints that were accompanied by highly emotional images that suggested incrimination. 
However, this pattern was only found when the fingerprints were poor quality, rendering the 
decision more ambiguous and uncertain. Similar patterns have been found in more recent 
studies with ordinary people making judgments about pairs of fingerprints (Langenburg, 
Champod, & Wertheimer, 2009), and in a replication of Dror and colleagues’ study (Osborne 
& Zajac, 2016).  
There is an obvious concern that arises from using lay people rather than experts and 
the concern relates to how comparable the results will be and whether undergraduate data is 
generalizable to experts. Experts are better able to discriminate between similar fingerprints 
(Thompson & Tangen, 2014), but novice examiners tend to be no better than lay people at 
matching fingerprints (Thompson, Tangen, & McCarthy, 2014), and lay people can 
discriminate between prints at an above-chance level (Vokey, Tangen, & Cole, 2009). 
Although there may be differences between experts and novices in their ability to perform 
fingerprint analysis and maybe even differences in contextual bias susceptibility, contextual 
bias effects appear to be robust to expertise level. For example, Dror and colleagues (2006) 
presented five experts with sets of fingerprints that they had determined were a match in 
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previous cases. However, this time the researchers told the experts that these prints were 
from a high profile case involving the FBI and Brandon Mayfield. The experts were familiar 
with the case and therefore knew that if the prints were from this case, they should not match. 
Dror and colleagues found that only one expert determined the prints to be a match now, as 
they had in the past. The remaining experts all said that the prints either did not match now, 
or that the crime sample was too degraded to decide. These results also show that contextual 
bias can work against finding a match when the context suggests that a match is unlikely.  
Dror and Charlton (2006) demonstrated similar results with a different group of 
experts, but this time there was a control group where examiners were shielded from 
additional contextual information. Expert fingerprint examiners were asked to assess 
fingerprint materials from eight past cases. The examiners had judged half of these past cases 
as individualizations (they were a match), or exclusions (they were not a match). For the 
study, the examiners either received no contextual information (4 cases), context suggesting 
the prints should match (Incriminating evidence; 2 cases), or context suggest the prints 
should not match (Exculpatory evidence; 2 cases) along with each set of prints. Exculpatory 
evidence was found to influence fingerprint experts by making the examiner’s decisions 
more conservative. In three cases where the examiners had said the prints matched in the 
past, the exculpatory evidence lead to the examiners to conclude that the prints did not match 
now, and in one case the examiner said the materials were inconclusive. However, there was 
no effect of incriminating evidence on expert decision-making found in this study, and in two 
cases the experts made a decision inconsistent with their past determination in the absence of 
context. So, inconsistencies can occur even without the influence of context.  
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Is There a Solution to the Problem of Contextual Bias in Forensic Examination? 
What have researchers recommended to combat contextual bias in forensic contexts? 
In the empirical papers on this issue of forensically-relevant contextual bias, authors have 
typically suggested shielding forensic examiners from contextual information (Dror et al., 
2005) or gradually introducing levels of contextual information to examiners (Dror et al., 
2015; Dror, 2016). But an examiner can never be totally insulated from contextual 
information. Explicit exposure to contextual information through police communication or 
case information included when the evidence is handed over is not the only form of biasing 
information. Some forms of contextual information are almost impossible to prevent. 
Consider, for example, that forensic examiners are members of the community and are likely 
to be exposed to media reports on crimes in their area. Evidence from these cases may end up 
on their desk for examination. In addition, forensic experts and police tend to socialize in the 
same circles, as well as with each other. In fact, even the presentation of a single sample to 
be compared with the crime sample suggests that there is good evidence that the prints from 
this person should match the crime print (Wells, Wilford, & Smalarz, 2013). 
Evidence Lineups Versus Evidence Showups 
In this study, I tested a different type of potential solution to the problem of 
contextual bias—one that is designed to moderate the effect of contextual bias, while 
accepting that contextual information will always be available to examiners. Instead of 
shielding examiners from contextual information, Wells, Wilford, and Smalarz (2013) 
proposed the use of evidence lineups as a way to dilute the effect of bias. This idea draws on 
the already well-developed research in eyewitness identification that seeks to reduce the 
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chances that innocent people who become suspects in an investigation will be mistakenly 
identified by an eyewitness. One of the main ideas to come out of eyewitness research is the 
idea that a lineup is more protective of innocent suspects than is a showup (Steblay, Dysart, 
Fulero, and Lindsay, 2003). A showup is where an eyewitness is shown a single individual, 
who is a suspect, and asked to determine whether they are the culprit. A showup would be 
equivalent to the current, standard procedure for forensic examination—the crime sample is 
presented with a sample obtained from a single suspect and the examiner is asked to decide if 
the samples are a match. A lineup is different from a showup because a lineup embeds the 
suspect among other people who, although known to be innocent, fit the description of the 
culprit that was obtained from the eyewitness (Wells, 1993). These non-suspect lineup 
members are called lineup fillers. So, now the test is not simply whether the eyewitness can 
tell if the individual is similar to the culprit, but rather the eyewitness needs to be able to pick 
the culprit out of a number of people who could plausibly be the culprit. Importantly, if the 
eyewitness picks someone from the lineup who is known to be innocent (a filler), there are 
no incriminating consequences of this incorrect identification for the filler. After all, filler are 
known-innocents in a lineup. 
How would lineups work in a forensic context such as with fingerprints materials? If 
the suspect sample is embedded in a lineup of other highly-similar samples, contextual 
information still cannot tell the examiner which of the samples is a match to the crime 
sample. Although the contextual information can raise expectations that one of the samples 
should be a match to the crime sample, contextual information cannot point the examiner to 
any one sample if the filler-control method is used. Thus, the examiner cannot simply use the 
contextual information and instead must perform a bottom-up analysis of the prints. In fact, 
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an expert examiner may simply decide not to rely on the contextual information at all 
because it is largely useless with respect to the task at hand. This aspect of the lineup 
procedure is what makes this solution qualitatively different from the other recommendations 
that attempt to shield examiners from contextual information. An evidence lineup does not 
rely on contextual information being hidden from examiners, or examiners using their 
“willpower” to be objective. Instead, the use of fillers should tend to neutralize or dilute the 
contextual information due to the fact that the contextual information is not specific to one of 
the samples but instead applies to the set of samples as a whole.  
To test the viability of the filler-control procedure, I had undergraduate participants 
learn about fingerprint examination, and then decide whether a single fingerprint matched a 
crime print (standard forensic procedure), or whether one of six fingerprints matched a crime 
print (filler-control procedure). Sometimes, the prints were presented with an incriminating 
police case report, and sometimes they were not. 
Predictions Based on Eyewitness Identification and Contextual Bias Literatures 
The first prediction was that the standard (i.e., no fillers) forensic match procedure 
would show a contextual bias effect. That is, there would be significantly more affirmative 
match decisions made by participants when they received incriminating contextual 
information prior to examining the fingerprint materials than when they did not receive such 
contextual information. Also, this effect of incriminating contextual information should be 
most pronounced when the prints are more ambiguous. Under ambiguous situations the 
bottom-up analysis does not give a clear answer, and so people are more susceptible to 
influence from top-down processes (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). This pattern of results 
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would conceptually replicate experiments completed by other research laboratories using 
fingerprint materials (Dror et al., 2005; Zajac & Osborne, 2016).  
A number of additional hypotheses were derived from the eyewitness identification 
literature regarding lineups and showups because of their close analogy to the filler-control 
procedure and the standard procedure, respectively, in a forensic match test. First, the 
eyewitness identification literature shows more affirmative choosing for lineups than for 
showups. This is due to the fact that there are more faces that could potentially resemble an 
eyewitness’s memory of the culprit when viewing a lineup than when viewing a showup. 
Similarly, it was predicted that there would be more affirmative match decisions for the 
fingerprint lineup than for the fingerprint showup due to the fact that there are more possible 
prints to resemble the latent print.  
The eyewitness literature shows, however, that this higher rate of affirmative 
responding for lineups than for showups does not result in more mistaken affirmative 
responses on the innocent suspect. This is because, although there is more choosing for 
lineups because there are more options, the innocent suspect is no longer the only plausible 
choice. In fact, there are a number of other fillers that match the description of the culprit as 
well. Because the innocent suspect is not actually the culprit and therefore not a great match 
to the eyewitness’ memory, choosing will spread out to the fillers, thereby reducing the false 
positives on the innocent suspect to a level that is significantly lower than the rate observed 
for showups (filler siphoning; Wells, Smalarz, & Smith, 2015; Wells, Smith, & Smalarz, 
2015). Fillers will also siphon some positive identifications away from the actual culprit, but 
to a lesser extent because the culprit is a good match to memory. This phenomenon is called 
differential filler siphoning as the fillers have a differential effect contingent on whether the 
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actual culprit is in the lineup. Good fillers will siphon away from an innocent suspect more 
than they will from a guilty suspect, and this is the mechanism through which the ratio of 
innocent suspect identifications and actual culprit identifications (as well as d´ values) 
improves when lineups are used. Based on this consistent result in the eyewitness literature, it 
was predicted that this same differential filler siphoning would occur when comparing 
fingerprint lineups to fingerprint showups.  
Another hypothesis for the current study was that contextual bias effects would be 
diluted in the filler-control procedure when compared to the standard procedure. In effect, 
this dilution prediction is closely related to the idea of filler siphoning. For example, if 
incriminating contextual information increases false affirmative match decisions by 12%, 
then the entire 12% increase would fall on the innocent suspect sample for the standard 
(showup type) procedure. For the filler-control procedure, however, the 12% increase in false 
affirmative responding that results from incriminating contextual information would dilute 
(spread) across the six samples, producing (on average) a mere 2% increase in false 
affirmative match decisions on the innocent suspect. An alternative hypothesis was that 
contextual information would have little or no effect at all on affirmative match decisions 
when using the filler-control method. This is because, although the contextual information 
suggests to the examiner that there should be a match, contextual information does not assist 
the examiner at all on being able to determine which of the six samples matches the crime 
sample. Accordingly, the contextual information does not relieve any of the examiner’s 
burden of relying as much as possible on the bottom-up approach. Hence, when given the 
fingerprint lineup (rather than the fingerprint showup) the examiner might simply dismiss the 
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contextual information as being irrelevant or unhelpful and rely almost totally on 
characteristics of the prints themselves.  
Finally, predictions were made about the confidence that the examiners expressed in 
their decisions.  First, confidence should be overall lower in the filler-control procedure 
because the task is more difficult. Furthermore, when people make an incorrect decision, 
confidence should be lower compared with when they make a correct decision. This is 
expected because there is typically a confidence-accuracy relation seen in eyewitness 
identification studies (Wixted & Wells, 2017) as well as other tasks for which people 
perform above chance levels. Also, the more ambiguous materials should result in lower 
confidence in the decisions too—this hypothesis functions as a manipulation check as well. 
Furthermore, when people make a decision that is incongruent with the suggestion in the 
contextual information (e.g. the context implies guilt but the participant says there is no 
match), confidence should be reduced compared with when the contextual information agrees 
with their match decision. Additionally, it was anticipated that there may be stronger 
evidence of contextual bias in the confidence measure rather than the binary match decision 
because the measure is much more sensitive (scores ranging from 0 to 100% confidence 
compared with a two-option forced choice measure). 
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CHAPTER 2.  METHOD 
Participants and Design 
A total of 244 undergraduate participants from a Midwestern University took part in 
the study for partial course credit. All participants were fluent English speakers and over the 
age of 18 years. Nine participants were excluded from analyses due to experimenter error, or 
unusual participant behavior. There were four independent variables in this study: what 
procedure was used, whether contextual information was provided, how difficult the task 
was, and whether or not one of the samples actually did match the crime sample. The design 
was a 2 (context: context vs. no context) x 2 (procedure: standard vs. filler-control method) x 
2 (ambiguity: more ambiguous vs. less ambiguous) x 2 (match presence: match present vs. 
match absent) mixed factorial model.  
Context, procedure, and ambiguity were manipulated between subjects and match 
presence manipulated within subjects. Participants were randomly assigned to ambiguity, 
procedure, and context conditions, and half of the fingerprints that each participant saw 
matched, and half did not, presented in a random order. Refer to Table 1 for a breakdown of 
the numbers in the between subjects groups. 
Materials 
The session began with a training video on fingerprint analysis (Introduction to 
Fingerprint Analysis, 8:00), created using information about FBI standards and training for 
fingerprint analysis. The video consists of a series of informative Power Point slides with a 
voice over and contains information about the background of fingerprint analysis, how an 
analysis is performed, and then a number of working examples for the participants. 
Participants watched the video on the computer screen with headphones on. The training 
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video and response questions were all presented on a desktop computer using MediaLab 
software. 
The fingerprint samples were from a previous study by Marcon (2009), using 
fingerprints from 125 students at the University of Texas at El Paso. There were three 
different levels of print quality. Rolled fingerprints include the entire print from the tip of the 
finger and are rolled slowly and deliberately from one side of the finger to the other to ensure 
the print is clear. Plain fingerprints are not rolled, so they do not include as much detail from 
the sides of the finger and can sometimes be unclear or smudged. Partial fingerprints, or 
latent fingerprints, occur when someone quickly touches a surface, not attempt to leave a 
deliberate print. Partial fingerprints typically lack detail, are smudged, or unclear. Marcon 
also had 60 undergraduates rate how distinct and typical each print is from all the other 
prints. The final library of fingerprint sets that are rated consists of fingerprints from 113 
undergraduates. 
Crime scene samples in the more ambiguous condition were drawn from the less clear 
plain prints, or partial print samples. In the less ambiguous condition, in contrast, the crime 
prints were drawn from rolled or plain prints, and were complete, with sharper lines and no 
smudging. Fillers samples for the filler-control procedure were selected based whether they 
had the same fingerprint pattern (loop, whorl, or arch) and came from the same finger (index, 
thumb, etc). In the more ambiguous condition, the filler samples were also pulled from 
partial or less clear plain fingerprint samples, whereas the less ambiguous condition the 
fillers are clearer. The fingerprints were selected so that the fingerprints were representative 
of the range of typicality and distinctiveness ratings collected by Marcon (2009).  
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Each set of fingerprints consisted of one crime sample, and then a different 
impression of the print from that same finger was used as the “match” sample. Then, six 
other fingerprints were selected with the same type of pattern, from the same finger, with the 
same level of clarity at the matching sample. Then, from these six fingerprints, one was 
randomly selected to be the “innocent suspect” print. This print appeared in the standard 
procedure for that fingerprint set as the “no match” sample. In the filler-control procedure, 
the matching sample or the “innocent suspect” print was embedded amongst the other five 
fingerprints which were ordered randomly in to a 2 by 3 lineup configuration. Refer to 
Appendix A for all of the fingerprint materials used in this experiment. Prior to running the 
full experiment, the filler-control materials were tested on a smaller sample of participants (N 
= 68) with contextual information (the condition that would be the most time consuming) to 
determine how much time participant’s would take to make match decisions concerning four 
cases, ensure that there were no ceiling or floor effects, ensure that the filler samples were 
plausible options, and test whether the more ambiguous condition was more difficult. See 
Table 2 for a break down of these pilot data with the 16 sets of fingerprints in the filler-
control method, eight of which were more ambiguous.  
The average amount of time taken to run through the instructions and the training 
video, complete four cases with evidence lineups and a police case report (contextual 
information) to read, and receive the oral debriefing was 29 minutes (rounded to the nearest 
minute). Therefore, it was concluded that it was feasible for each participant to analyze eight 
cases in an hour to increase the power of the study. There were no ceiling or floor effects—
when there was an actual match present, participants matched that print to the crime sample 
approximately half of the time (50% of the time for less ambiguous materials, and 44% for 
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more ambiguous materials). When no match was present, people were picking the innocent 
suspect sample some of the time (15% of the time for less ambiguous materials, and 10% for 
more ambiguous materials). These proportions were also consistent with expectations 
regarding the ambiguity level—there were less correct matches in the more ambiguous 
materials, and people’s confidence in their match decisions were lower in the more 
ambiguous materials condition (72.5% confident for less ambiguous materials, and 65.5% in 
the more ambiguous materials). Finally, participants were matching filler samples to the 
crime print some of the time, and more often when there was no actual match present (27% 
fillers when there was a match present, and 55% of the time when there was not), which is 
what would be expected according to the eyewitness literature (Wells, Smith, & Smalarz, 
2015; Wells, Smalarz, & Smith, 2015). When people picked fillers, choosing was spread 
across the lineups, rather than one of the fillers standing out in the lineup. Therefore, these 
materials appeared to be appropriate for testing the hypotheses in the current study. 
Procedure 
Participants signed up for the study using an online recruitment system, and came into 
the laboratory to complete the experiment. The session began with the experimenter briefly 
describing the task and providing a consent form that the participant could ask questions 
about and sign. First, participants were instructed to put on their headphones and pay 
attention to the training video presented on the computer screen. Next, participants read 
through a series of instructions (Refer to the Appendix B for the complete instructions). They 
were told that these materials are from real cases and that each case has a suspect, who may 
or may not be the actual perpetrator. Participants were told that they would see materials 
from eight real cases, to be analyzed one at a time. For each case, participants were asked to 
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make an assessment about whether or not the comparison print(s) matched the crime print, 
and how confident they were in their decision. Participants were asked if they had any 
questions about the task. If they did not, they were given a scientific-grade magnifying glass 
with an LED light to aid their examination and more closely mimic a real expert’s 
experience.  
When the task began, participants would either see fingerprint sets that were all from 
the more ambiguous materials (eight total), or fingerprint sets from the less ambiguous 
materials (eight total), always randomly ordered. Half of these always had a match present, 
and half always had a match absent, and this was also randomly ordered. Those who were 
assigned to the condition where they were provided with contextual information were told in 
the instructions that they would also receive extra information in the form of a police case. 
Each case report was given to the participants for them to read prior to examining each set of 
fingerprint materials. There were eight different police case reports containing details about 
different types of crimes—kidnapping, extortion, armed robbery, bomb threat, homicide, 
rape, arson, and identity theft. Each report was highly suggestive of guilt, for example one 
reported that DNA evidence found under the victims nails was a match to the suspect. We 
randomly ordered each of the eight police case reports to be presented with any one of the 
eight fingerprint sets each person in the context condition received. Refer to Appendix C for 
all of the case reports used in this experiment. If they were not assigned to the contextual 
information group, they never saw a police case report. 
The cases were handed to the participants one-by-one by the experimenter in a manila 
folder, with the fingerprint materials enclosed, laminated, and labeled as if it were real 
evidence. Participants responded to questions about the materials on the computer screen 
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about each case. Participants who were assigned to the standard procedure received one 
comparison print for each case. For these participants, the instructions clearly stated that, 
although there is a suspect in each case, this does not mean that they are the person who 
committed the crime—the fingerprint may or may not match the crime print. They were 
asked to respond to the question “Do the samples match?” with a “Yes” or a “No”. For the 
participants who were assigned to the filler-control procedure, they received a lineup of six 
comparison prints in each pack. Participants in the filler-control condition, like those in the 
standard condition, were told that although there is a suspect in each case, this does not mean 
that they are the person who committed the crime. However, participants were also told that 
they would see six sample fingerprints for each case and that five of the samples they will see 
were definitely not matches. So, if participants select one of the filler fingerprints then they 
have selected an innocent person’s prints. Filler-control participants were asked “Does one of 
these samples match the crime sample?” If participants responded yes, they needed to then 
indicate which of the samples was a match (the samples were numbered on the sheet “Sample 
1” through to “Sample 6”). Finally, for all cases, participants were asked “How confident are 
you in your decision in this case?” and rated their confidence on an 11-point scale from 0% 
(point “1”; not at all confident) to 100% (point 11; completely confident). The computer 
prompted them after each confidence rating to ask for the next set of case materials from the 
experimenter and the questions on screen were repeated. Once the participants had completed 
their judgments for all eight cases, participants were told that is the end of the experiment 
and the experimenter thanked the participant and gave them an oral debriefing. 
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CHAPTER 3. RESULTS 
Overview of Analyses 
Multilevel model analyses, using the LMER package in R Studio, were used to 
analyze these data to account for the nested nature of the design—each observation was 
nested within Fingerprint Set (N = 64) and each person assessed eight different fingerprint 
sets, so observations were also nested within Participant (N = 234). These two grouping 
variables were included at Level 2 in the multilevel models, and the relevant intraclass 
correlations can be found in Table 9. The predictors entered in the model were Ambiguity 
Level (more ambiguous = 1, less ambiguous = 0), Context Presence (context present = 1, no 
context = 0), Procedure Type (standard procedure = 0, filler-control procedure = 1), and 
Match Presence (match present = 1, match absent = 0). Finally, the Context Type was 
entered as a categorical control variable to allow for any variation due to the eight different 
case reports used as contextual information here. Each trial or case analyzed represented one 
data point in these analyses, and each participant provided eight data points. The use of 
Participant as a Level 2 grouping variable accounted for the repeated measures nature of 
these data, and any variation that could be attributed to a single person’s unique biases and 
perceptions was allowed for in the model (see Figures 1 and 2 for graphical representations 
of the models).  
For the full model of each analysis, a marginal R2 is reported, which is the amount of 
variation in the outcome explained by the predictors in the model, and the conditional R2 is 
also reported which represents the amount of variation in the outcome explained by all 
variables in the model, including higher-level, grouping variables. The dependent measure 
was determined by the research question being addressed. Any outcome variables associated 
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with participants’ match decisions were binary, so these models used logistic multilevel 
regression models. A full breakdown of the terminology used to describe the different 
outcome decisions can be found in Table 3. Affirmative “Match” decisions can be either 
correct (“Hits”) or incorrect (“False alarms”), and different effects were hypothesized for 
these two kinds of “match” decision. These were coded as binary variables—the presence of 
a “hit” or “false alarm” is coded as “1” and absence coded as “0”. False alarms can also fall 
on a filler sample in the filler-control procedure, but unless specifically mentioned, fillers are 
not included in the analyses. “Choosing” refers to “Match” (coded 1) decisions, as oppose to 
“No Match” (coded 0) decisions, and includes situations where people match the crime 
sample to a filler sample in the filler-control procedure. “Suspect choosing” refers to a 
“match” decision where the correct sample is selected (“hits”), or the innocent suspect’s print 
is selected (“false alarms”). “No match” decision can be incorrect (a “miss”) or correct (a 
“correct rejection”). The confidence measure will also feature as the dependent measure in 
some analyses, and because confidence is a continuous measure, logistic regression analyses 
were not used when analyzing the confidence measure. 
Overview of Results 
There were a number of interesting results in these data that were consistent with my 
predictions. First, the context bias effects found in previous work (e.g. Dror et al., 2005) were 
replicated under the specific conditions that were anticipated to produce the strongest effects. 
Specifically, the presence of incriminating contextual information resulted in significantly 
more false alarms when the materials were very ambiguous and the standard procedure (only 
one sample was compared to the crime sample) was used. In contrast, there was no evidence 
of contextual bias when hits were assessed, or when the fingerprint materials were less 
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ambiguous. Furthermore, no contextual bias effects were observed in the filler-control 
conditions. That is, whether or not incriminating contextual information was presented to 
participants, there was no significant change in hit rates or false alarm rates in the filler-
control procedure. 
Interestingly, the filler-control procedure appeared to be superior to the standard 
procedure even for participants in the no-context conditions. Although the filler-control 
procedure reduce the rate of hits compared to the standard procedure, the filler-control 
procedure resulted in a much larger drop in false alarms compared with the reduction in hits. 
In addition, there was no significant increase in “no match” decisions in the filler-control 
procedure. In fact, there was no significant difference in either the number of misses or in the 
number of correct rejections in the filler-control when compared to the standard procedure. 
So, fingerprint lineups did not result in people to choosing to “back off” and refrain from 
saying there was a match compared to the standard procedure. Instead, the filler-control 
procedure led these match decisions to land on filler samples rather than suspect samples, 
particularly when the evidence lineup did not contain an actual match. Therefore, these data 
show evidence of the differential filler siphoning mechanism that occurs in eyewitness 
lineups—good fillers surrounding a suspect will draw choices away from the suspect, but 
will draw proportionately more choices away from an innocent suspect than from a guilty 
one (Wells, Smalarz, & Smith, 2015; Wells, Smith, & Smalarz, 2015).  
There was no support for the hypothesis that people’s confidence in their decisions 
would be boosted by contextual information when that information was consistent with their 
judgments (i.e. the participants says there is a match when the contextual information also 
suggests that there should be a match). Nevertheless, the confidence measure did serve as a 
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useful manipulation check to see if people found the filler-control procedure more difficult 
and whether they found the match in the more ambiguous materials less clear. Now, the data 
analyses, beginning with a full multilevel model of all the data and predictors, will be 
presented. I will explain how these results were obtained, and what they mean in a question 
and answer format with each question representing the hypotheses of the current study. 
Analysis of the Full Multilevel Model 
It was predicted that contextual bias effects would be found in the standard procedure, 
particularly when the materials were ambiguous, but these effects would be reduced in the 
filler-control procedure. Statistically speaking, a contextual bias effect would be 
characterized by a significant increase in “match” decisions, and this increase should be 
largest for “false alarms” (incorrect “match” decisions). Ideally, to show support for this 
hypothesis, a significant four-way interaction between Match Presence, Ambiguity Level, 
Context Presence, and Procedure Type should be demonstrated.  
To test for the four-way interaction, a model was run with “suspect choosing” as the 
outcome variable (so that filler fingerprint samples were excluded from the analysis), and all 
possible interactions between Match Presence, Ambiguity Level, Context Presence, and 
Procedure Type included. In addition, Context Type was included as a control variable, and 
the data was nested within Participant, and Fingerprint Set. The model failed to converge1. In 
an attempt to make the model merge, the model was reduced by removing Context Type as a 
control variable, given that there was no significant impact of any types of contextual 
information on suspect choosing in the full model. In addition, all the interactions that were 
                                                1	  29% of the variation in “false alarms” is explained by the predictors and interactions (Marginal R2 = 0.285) 
and 43% of the variation in “false alarms” is explained by all predictors in the model, including higher-level 
grouping variables (Conditional R2 = 0.428). Goodness of Fit: χ2 (8) = 24.785, p=0.002.	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not approaching significance (p<.10) were removed from the analysis. But the model still did 
not converge.  
At this point, I concluded this full model was not going to be useful for answering the 
research questions of this experiment. Clearly with this many predictors, a control variable 
with eight categories, and a binary outcome, the model is not going to converge, so 
interpreting any effects from the full model is not appropriate. The validity of the full model 
is questionable and, therefore, should not be interpreted. Hence, the data analysis strategy 
was driven by specific tests of the a priori hypothesis that motivated this research. These 
predictions were sound, and based on previous literature in the forensic psychology and 
eyewitness psychology domain. The following statistical analyses address each of the 
hypotheses driving this research. 
Was There a Contextual Bias Effect in the Standard Procedure? 
The first hypothesis was that the contextual bias effects found in previous research 
would be replicated (for example, Dror et al., 2005). When contextual information indicates 
that a particular outcome is more likely, people are more likely to make decisions consistent 
with the expectation created by that information (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Saks et al., 
2003). The case reports were highly suggestive of guilt, which should have created an 
expectation that the prints should match. Accordingly I hypothesized that participants who 
received the standard procedure would make more affirmative “match” decisions—hits and 
false alarms—when an incriminating police case report was presented with the fingerprints. 
This effect was expected to be most prominent when the materials were more ambiguous (as 
was found in Dror et al., 2005), and when there was no actual match present (supported by 
eyewitness identification research e.g. Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, and Lindsay, 2003).  
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All standard procedure data. Initially a model was run using the data from 
participant who received the standard procedure. Ambiguity Level (more ambiguous = 1, 
less ambiguous = 0) and Context Presence (context presence = 1, context absent = 0) were 
entered into the model as predictors. The initial analysis with “Suspect choosing” 
(culprit/innocent suspect print chosen = 1, any other decision = 0) as the outcome variable in 
this model, and Match Presence (true match = 1, no match = 0) included as a predictor 
suffered from similar issues to the full model and failed to converge. Accordingly, hits (hit = 
1, any other decision = 0) and false alarms (false alarm = 1, any other decision = 0) were 
assessed as outcome variables in separate models so that the Match Presence factor could be 
removed from the analysis. In both models, the effect of Context Presence (hits: B = 0.099, p 
= 0.767, false alarms: B = 0.054, p = 0.897), Ambiguity Level (hits: B = -0.727, p =0.519; 
false alarms: B = -0.293, p = 0.767), and the interaction (hits: B = -0.076, p = 0.862, false 
alarms: B = 0.916, p = 0.117) did not reach significance. This was not surprising, because 
contextual bias effects were expected to be strongest for more ambiguous materials and for 
false alarms, which is only a small subset of these data. Therefore, the data were split into 
two subsets—people who received the less ambiguous materials, and people who received 
the more ambiguous materials.  
Separate analyses of more and less ambiguous materials. When the data from the 
participants who received the less ambiguous materials were examined separately, there was 
no effect of context on hits (B = 0.666, p = 0.355), or false alarms (B = 0.577, p = 0.531). So, 
as predicted, I concluded that there is no evidence of contextual bias in the data from those 
who received the less ambiguous materials. Next, the data from participants who received the 
more ambiguous fingerprint materials were analyzed. Again, hits and false alarms were 
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assessed separately as outcome variable. As expected based on the proportions observed in 
Table 5, there was no significant effect of context on hits (B = 0.032, p = 0.916). However, 
there was a significant effect of context on false alarms (B = 0.769, p = 0.018)2. Refer to 
Table 10 for a summary of these results.  
Conclusion. There was evidence of contextual bias in these data, but the effect of 
contextual bias only occurred under very specific circumstances—the circumstances that 
were predicted to be the most conducive to a contextual bias effect based on previous 
literature. When materials were very ambiguous, and there was no actual match present, 
contextual information influenced the number of match decisions in the standard procedure 
for forensic examination. In other words, when people received incriminating contextual 
information, there were significantly more incorrect match decisions (42% match decisions) 
made compared with when participants received no contextual information (25% incorrect 
match decisions). There was a striking 17% difference due to the presence of contextual 
information, which was statistically significant. Refer to Tables 4 and 5 for a summary of 
proportions of participants who made each type of decision separated by procedure, 
ambiguity, and context conditions. 
Was There a Contextual Bias Effect in the Filler-Control Procedure? 
Having established the conditions under which contextual bias occurs in the standard 
procedure, the next hypothesis to address was that the filler-control procedure would 
moderate the contextual bias effect seen in the standard procedure. That is, it was anticipated 
that there would be a smaller difference or no difference in affirmative “match” decisions 
when there was context present versus context absent in the filler-control procedure. If there 
                                                2	  1% of the variation in “suspect choosing” is explained by the predictors and interactions (Marginal R2 = 
0.008) and 82% of the variation in “suspect choosing” is explained by all predictors in the model, including 
higher-level grouping variables (Conditional R2 = 0.816). Goodness of Fit: χ2 (8) =3.052, p=.931 (good fit).	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was no significant main effect of context on “suspect choosing” decisions (hits and false 
alarms), this hypothesis would be supported by these data.  
All filler-control procedure data. As for the analysis in the previous section, a 
model was run with “suspect choosing” as the outcome variable with only the data obtained 
from participant who received the filler-control procedure. All possible interactions between 
Match Presence, Context Presence, and Ambiguity Level were included, as well as Context 
Type as a control variable. Fingerprint Set and Participant were included as higher-level 
grouping variables. The full model failed to converge, and there were no significant 
interactions3. When, hits and false alarms were examined separately, there were no 
significant effects (Context Presence, Ambiguity Level, and the two-way interaction). 
However, because the contextual bias effects were only found under very specific conditions 
in the standard procedure, the data were split into less and more ambiguous subsets to 
confirm there was no evidence of contextual bias. 
Separate analyses of more and less ambiguous materials. As anticipated, there 
were no significant effects of Context Presence for hit rates (B = 0.339, p = 0.748), or false 
alarm rates (B = -0.163, p = 0.721) when the materials were less ambiguous. Therefore, 
contextual bias did not appear to have an impact on less ambiguous materials, whether or not 
the standard procedure or an evidence lineup was used. But any contextual bias effects in the 
filler-control procedure were most likely to be found under circumstances where the evidence 
lineup decision is ambiguous, as was found in the standard procedure. The more ambiguous 
materials were analyzed next to see whether there was any evidence of contextual bias. Was 
there any evidence of an effect of context presence? Was the effect of context presence 
                                                3	  26% of the variation in “suspect choosing” is explained by the predictors and interactions (Marginal R2 = 
0.258) and 43% of the variation in “suspect choosing” is explained by all predictors in the model, including 
higher-level grouping variables (Conditional R2 = 0.426). Goodness of Fit: χ2 (8) = 11.52, p=0.174 (good fit).	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reduced compared to the same conditions in the standard procedure? When the model was 
run, there was no significant effect of context on hits (B = -0.221, p = 0.486) or false alarms 
(B = 0.140, p = 0.753) when the fingerprint materials were very ambiguous. 
Conclusion. There was no evidence of contextual bias in the filler-control procedure. 
The hypothesis that evidence lineups would reduce the influence of contextual information 
on affirmative “match” decisions was supported. In fact, the contextual bias affect appeared 
to be totally eliminated for false alarms (10% false alarm rate for both context present and 
context absent conditions), and hits actually appeared to reduce in the context condition 
compared with the no context condition (40% versus 47% respectively; refer to Table 5).  
Does the Filler-Control Procedure Decrease “False Alarms” Compared with the 
Standard Procedure? 
Some of the analyses have already indicated that the filler-control procedure reduces 
the number of “false alarms” that occur, for example the filler-control procedure eliminated 
the boost in false alarms that occurred in the presence of incriminating contextual 
information. The observed proportions, found in Tables 4 and 5, also show that the filler-
control procedure seems to consistently reduce the average false alarm rate to approximately 
8 to 10%, regardless of ambiguity of the materials and whether context is present. False 
alarm rates in the standard procedure are consistently higher in these data—an average of 
33.5% of the time, which is 23.5% higher than that highest false alarm rate in the filler-
control procedure. So, the following analyses examined the significance of this observed 
difference. 
First, a model was run with false alarms as the outcome variable (false alarm = 1, any 
other decision = 0) and all possible interactions between Context Presence, Ambiguity Level, 
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and Procedure Type, and with data from both procedure types. The model failed to converge, 
so the model was reduced to only the main effects. In this final, reduced model, there was 
only one significant effect: Procedure Type (B = -1.905, p = 0.011)4. That is, the standard 
procedure resulted in significantly more false alarms overall (M = 33.5%) than did the fill-
control procedure (M = 9.25%), as was hypothesized. None of the other variables in the 
model (Ambiguity Level, or Context Presence) had a significant effect false alarms overall. 
Refer to Table 11 for a summary of these results. 
Does the Filler-control Procedure Reduce the Number of Correct Match Decisions 
Compared with the Standard Procedure? 
I expected that the filler-control method might also result in a reduction in correct 
match decisions (hits) because this is the typical pattern observed in lineups when they are 
compared to showups.  Specifically, in eyewitness identification research showups result in 
more innocent suspect identifications, but also more correct identifications, when compared 
with lineups (Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2003). Did this pattern also hold in the 
current experiment? The full model run on “suspect choosing” could have helped to address 
this question, but it failed to converge. Therefore, a multilevel model was run with hits (hit = 
1, any other decision = 0) as the outcome variable, and data from both procedure types 
included in the model. Procedure Type, Context Presence, and Ambiguity Level were 
included as predictors and Fingerprint Set and Participant were, again, included as a higher-
level grouping variables. However, none of the predictors resulted in significant effects. In 
particular, there was no evidence of a significant difference in hits based on procedure type 
                                                4	  8% of the variation in “false alarms” is explained by the predictors and interactions (Marginal R2 = 0.081) and 
71% of the variation in “false alarms” is explained by all predictors in the model, including higher-level 
grouping variables (Conditional R2 = 0.713). Goodness of Fit: χ2 (8) = 19.203, p=0.014.	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(B = -0.990, p = 0.392), even when interactions and the control variable were excluded. Refer 
to Table 11 for a summary of these results. 
Even though the multilevel analysis did not show a significant difference in hit rates, 
the observed proportions clearly show that the hit rate is reduced in the filler-control 
procedure. In the filler-control procedure there was a mean percentage of 44.5% of 
participants correctly matching the suspect print to the crime print, which was significantly 
fewer than the 65% of participants correctly matching the suspect print to the crime print in 
the standard procedure (20.5% decrease overall; %; χ2 = 39.98, p<0.001, 95% CI [14.07%, 
26.74%]). The presence of context did not change this pattern, but the ambiguity of materials 
had a small impact. The more ambiguous materials resulted in 15.5% fewer correct match 
decisions for the filler-control procedure (filler-control: 43.5%; standard: 59%; χ2 = 11.61, 
p=0.001, 95% CI [6.32%, 24.41%]) compared with the 26% decrease observed in the less 
ambiguous materials (filler-control: 46%; standard: 72%; χ2 = 32.37, p<0.001, 95% CI 
[16.80%, 34.79]). 
Although these differences were not significant in the multilevel model, there was a 
drop in correct “matches” when the filler-control procedure was used. However, the observed 
drop in hits appears to be far less than the drop in false alarms, seen in Tables 4 and 5. The 
next section will specifically test the tradeoff between a small reduction in hits and a large 
reduction in false alarms—is the reduction in false alarms proportionately larger than the 
reduction in hits? 
Does the Filler-Control Procedure Result in Better, Applied Outcomes? 
The findings presented so far show that the filler-control procedure reduced the 
number of times people were able to correctly identify the print that is actually a match 
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(“hits”). But, these results also indicated that the filler-control procedure vastly reduced the 
number of incorrect match decisions on an innocent suspect’s print (“false alarms”). 
However, the question remains—does the reduction in false alarms in the filler-control 
procedure outweigh any loss of hits that also results? Forensic policy makers do not want to 
reduce examiner’s chances of identifying a true match, but a slight reduction in hits might be 
justifiable if the reduction in false alarms is large enough, as false alarms contribute to 
wrongful conviction (equivalent to innocent suspect identifications in eyewitness literature). 
The observed reduction in false alarms was much larger than the reduction in hits, 
particularly in the more ambiguous condition—there was a 15.5% reduction in hits compared 
with a 23.5% reduction in false alarms overall. As mentioned previously, this difference was 
even more pronounced when contextual information effects are considered. When context 
was present, false alarms were reduced by 32% when the filler-control procedure was used, 
compared with a 15% reduction in false alarms when context was not present. 
Use of signal detection theory measures. One way to look at data where there is a 
proportion of correct affirmative decisions, and a proportion of incorrect affirmative 
decisions is Signal Detection Theory using a measure called d´. There was both a decrease in 
incorrect match decisions (“false alarms”) and correct match decisions (“hits”) in the filler-
control procedure. So, the filler-control method reduced the number of incorrect matches 
made, but also reduced the correct matches people made. This is similar to the patterns 
observed in showups and lineups (Steblay et al., 2003). Situations in which a manipulation 
produces the same directional change in both hits and false alarms (i.e., both increase or both 
decrease) can be analyzed using d´. 
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Whereas d´ is generally used as a measure of psychological discriminability, it is not 
presumed to be a measure of psychological discriminability when it is used on lineup data 
(see Wells, Smalarz, & Smith, 2015; Wells, Smith, & Smalarz, 2015). The reason that d´ is 
not a measure of memory discriminability for lineup data is because it ignores a large share 
of false positive responses (on fillers), thereby violating assumptions of Signal Detection 
Theory. However, as an applied measure of performance, it has been argued that a d´ analysis 
on suspect identifications in lineups is a reasonable way to assess whether the trade-off in 
reduced identifications of the culprit is compensated by the reduction in mistaken 
identifications of innocent suspects (see Mickes, et al., 2014). See Table 8 for the d´ values 
for each condition, separated by ambiguity, procedure, and context conditions. Higher d´ 
values indicate that the number of innocent suspect picks is low relative to the number of 
correct match decisions, and lower d´ value indicate that the number of innocent suspect 
picks is high when compared with the number of correct matches. So, when thinking about 
the trade-off between hits and false alarms, the better procedure should yield a higher d´ 
value.  
Analyses using d´ values. For the ambiguous materials, the lowest d´ value was 
obtained in the context-present condition with the standard procedure (d´ = 0.691), followed 
by the context-absent condition with the standard procedure (d´ = 0.939). However, the filler-
control method obtained higher d´ values than both of the standard procedure conditions, 
regardless of the context presence manipulation (context: d´ = 1.156; no context: d´ = 1.190). 
Table 8 shows that the less ambiguous materials achieved higher average d´ in each condition 
than the more ambiguous materials too, as expected. But in all conditions, the filler-control 
method proved to be superior, even over and above simply removing contextual information 
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from the procedure. An analysis with d´ was run with the full dataset, to examine whether 
there was a three-way interaction between Ambiguity Level, Procedure Type, and Context 
Presence on d´ values. A three-way ANOVA was used to analyze these data (refer to Table 
13 for a summary of all d´ inferential analyses). There was no significant three-way 
interaction (F(1, 229) = 0.659, p = 0.418), but there was an interaction between Ambiguity 
Level and Procedure Type (F(1, 229) = 16.447, p <.001). So, the filler-control procedure had 
the most benefit when the materials were ambiguous.  
To confirm, a two-way ANOVA with context and procedure as factors was used to 
determine whether the d´ values for participants who received more ambiguous materials 
only were significantly different from one another. The interaction between context and 
procedure had a nonsignificant effect on d´values (F(1, 115) = 1.437, p = 0.233). There was 
also no main effect of context, suggesting that shielding people from contextual information 
had no significant impact on d´ or improving the ratio of incorrect and correct match 
decisions (F(1, 115) = 2.310, p = 0.131). But there was a main effect of procedure, indicating 
that the filler-control procedure significantly improved d´ (F(1, 115) = 34.661, p <0.001). 
These data suggest that shielding examiners from contextual information as much as possible 
would not be as effective as evidence lineups at maximizing the trade-off between incorrect 
and correct match decisions in a forensic context (Dror et al., 2015; Saks et al., 2003; Wells, 
Wilford, & Smalarz, 2013). 
Is the Increase in d´ from the Filler-Control Procedure due to Differential Filler 
Siphoning? 
In the eyewitness identification literature, the reduction in innocent suspect 
identifications that is observed when a lineup is used comes as a result of filler siphoning 
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(Wells, Smalarz, & Smith, 2015; Wells, Smith, & Smalarz, 2015). In other words, good 
fillers effectively draw (siphon) false positives, or “choosing”, away from an innocent 
suspect. These same fillers, however, draw fewer choices away from the culprit because the 
culprit (having been the source of the witnesses’ memories) tends to be the best choice. But 
when the actual culprit is not in the lineup, then all of the options in the lineup are equally 
plausible with regard to matching the eyewitnesses’ memory. Hence, these fillers tend to 
strongly compete with the innocent suspect for choices by the eyewitness.  
The filler-control method was anticipated to mirror the patterns seen in eyewitness 
lineups and show differential filler siphoning effects. Previous analyses reported in the 
current paper showed that the filler-control method (compared to the standard method) 
decreased false match decisions on the innocent suspect prints. But, there are two possible 
ways that the presence of fillers can decrease false match decisions on the innocent suspect 
samples. First, the presence of fillers might have increased correct rejections. Alternatively, 
the presence of fillers might have spread the false match decisions to false match decisions 
the fillers (filler siphoning). The previous analyses on incorrect match decisions on the 
innocent suspect sample did not tell us which of these occurred. This same question can be 
asked about the reduction in correct match decisions in the filler-control procedure versus the 
standard procedure. Was this reduction the result of filler siphoning or was this reduction the 
result of an increase in incorrect rejections? 
Analysis of all “choosing”. If filler siphoning was underlying reason for the 
reduction in incorrect match decisions observed in the filler-control procedure, then there 
should be no increase in the number of “no match” decisions (“correct rejections”) as a 
function of the introduction of fillers. Likewise, if filler siphoning was underlying reason for 
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the reduction in correct match decisions observed in the filler-control procedure, then there 
should be no increase in the number of “no match” decisions (“misses”) as a function of the 
introduction of fillers. A full model was run with “choosing” (match decision = 1, no match 
decision = 2) as the outcome variable. This was different from the full model analysis run on 
“suspect choosing” as now occasions where people said match, but selected a filler, are 
coded as “match” decisions. Match Presence, Procedure Type, Context Presence, and 
Ambiguity Level were included as predictors, but the model failed to converge. The model 
was reduced to include only the interactions that were approaching significance (Match 
Presence by Procedure Type, and Context Presence and Ambiguity Level). This model did 
converge, and the results revealed a significant Match Presence by Procedure Type 
interaction (B = -0.801, p = 0.041; Table 11)5.  
The nature of this interaction can be seen by looking at the proportions reported in 
Table 4—in the filler-control procedure, people said that there was a “match” to the crime 
print significantly more often than people in the standard procedure. Furthermore, this 
difference in the number of “match” decisions between procedures was more pronounced 
when there was no match present. But, what is most interesting is that this increase in 
“match” decisions in the filler-control procedure did not result in more incorrect match 
decisions (false alarms), or more correct match decisions (hits). In fact, the analyses 
presented earlier in this paper show that hits and false alarms were reduced in the filler-
control procedure, even though the current analyses show that choosing is boosted overall in 
the filler-control procedure. But were these decreases in hits and false alarms are due to filler 
siphoning? People who would have chosen the culprit or innocent suspect print if they had 
                                                5	  11% of the variation in “choosing” is explained by the predictors and interactions (Marginal R2 = 0.105) and 
25% of the variation in “choosing” is explained by all predictors in the model, including higher-level grouping 
variables (Conditional R2 = 0.251). Goodness of Fit: χ2 (8) = 428.14, p<.001.	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received the standard procedure must be either “backing off” now that they need to choose 
the match from a lineup of fingerprints. Alternatively, people in the filler-control procedure 
may be still choosing to say there was a match, but now incorrectly selecting filler print 
samples. Specifically, I needed to show if people were making fewer hits and false alarms 
because they were now “missing” true matches, or “correctly rejecting” match absent trials 
more often, or they were selecting filler print samples that because they thought the fillers 
were a true “match” to the crime print instead. 
Separate analyses of “miss” and “correct rejection” rates. To address this 
question, the “miss” rates and the “correct rejection” rates were assessed between procedures 
in two separate models. Initially for both, full models were run with all possible interactions 
between Procedure Type, Context Presence, and Ambiguity, and Context Type as a control 
variable. The two higher-level grouping variables were included (Fingerprint Set and 
Participant). Neither of these converged, so the interactions and control variables were 
excluded. The final models (refer to Table 11) had no significant predictors, and showed that 
there was no significant effect of Procedure Type, and therefore no difference between the 
standard and filler-control procedure for either “misses” (B = -0.203, p = 0.7916) or “correct 
rejections” (B = -0.222, p = 0.8287), suggesting that people incorrectly chose a “no match” 
decision equally often in both procedures. This was the same pattern has been consistently 
observed when comparing eyewitness lineups and showups. These results indicated that the 
                                                6	  0.3% of the variation in “misses” is explained by the predictors and interactions (Marginal R2 = 0.003) and 
69% of the variation in “misses” is explained by all predictors in the model, including higher-level grouping 
variables (Conditional R2 = 0.691). Goodness of Fit: χ2 (8) = 19.413, p=0.013.	  7	  0.2% of the variation in “correct rejections” is explained by the predictors and interactions (Marginal R2 = 
0.002) and 85% of the variation in “correct rejections” is explained by all predictors in the model, including 
higher-level grouping variables (Conditional R2 = 0.846). Goodness of Fit: χ2 (8) = 30.041, p<.001.	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decrease in incorrect and correct match decisions (hits and false alarms) observed here was 
due to filler siphoning, not an increase in “no match” decisions. 
Are the Contextual Bias Effects and the Effect of the Filler-Control Procedure 
Reflected in the Confidence Measures? 
It was expected that the confidence measures would show that the filler-control 
method and more ambiguous materials would decrease confidence overall. The reasoning 
behind this hypothesis was that lineups and ambiguity makes it more difficult to determine 
the correct answer, and therefore should lower confidence in decisions. In addition, it was 
anticipated that contextual information congruent with a person’s decision (i.e., when the 
contextual information suggested the prints should match and the participant chose match), 
the contextual information should act as additional evidence in favor of their decision and 
boost their confidence. A full multilevel model was run initially with the data nested within 
Fingerprint Set and Participant (Level 2 grouping variables), allowing the variation in 
confidence that was due to fingerprint materials, and participants’ unique biases. Context 
Presence, Ambiguity Level, Procedure Type, and Match Presence were added as predictors, 
and Context Type as a control variable. Participants’ subjective confidence in their decision 
was the outcome variable. 
The model was first run with all possible interactions. No interaction terms were 
significant, but there was a significant effect of Ambiguity Level (B =-1.457, p = 0.002), and 
Procedure Type (B =-0.913, p = 0.050) was approaching significance. In addition, unlike in 
the binary models in the rest of the analyses, there was a significant effect of some Context 
Types so this control variable would be retained in future models. To help reduce the model, 
the “step” program in the LMER package in R was used to retrieve the best fitting model. 
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The model with the best fit included Ambiguity Level and Procedure Type as predictors, and 
no interactions. So, this reduced model was used to examine the confidence levels of 
participants (refer to Table 12 for a summary of these results)8. 
As hypothesized, the filler-control procedure (B = -0.4681, p=0.031), more ambiguity 
(B = -0.902, p<.001) resulted in significantly lower average confidence levels overall. The 
confidence results were largely consistent with our expectations and fit well with the 
contextual bias results described earlier. The materials that were less clear (more ambiguous) 
resulted in lower confidence. The more difficult task (filler-control procedure) also led to 
lower confidence levels. However, there was no consistent increase in confidence in 
participant’s decisions when the contextual information was congruent with the decision 
being made, indexed by a nonsignificant Context by Match Presence interaction. Refer to 
Tables 6 and 7 for summaries of the confidence levels for the decisions. 
  
                                                8	  6% of the variation in confidence is explained by the predictors and interactions (Marginal R2 = 0.121) and 
44% of the variation in confidence is explained by all predictors in the model, including higher-level grouping 
variables (Conditional R2 = 0.259). 
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CHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION 
Consistent with previous literature, these data demonstrate that the standard forensic 
examination procedures can lead to contextual bias effects when the samples are ambiguous. 
Using the standard procedure with the more ambiguous fingerprint materials, people who 
received information suggesting the suspect is guilty made more incorrect match decisions on 
the innocent suspect sample compared with people who received no contextual information 
(25% versus 42%). These results are consistent with previous literature showing contextual 
bias effects in fingerprint analysis (Dror et al., 2005; Dror et al., 2006; Obsorne & Zajac, 
2015) and add weight to the National Academy of Science’s concerns regarding forensic 
examination procedures (National Academy of Science, 2009). 
In addition, this paper breaks new ground. The research community and the National 
Academy of Science (2009) have been calling for a solution to the effect of contextual bias in 
forensic judgments. Previous literature has typically suggested shielding examiners from 
contextual information (Saks et al., 2003), but Wells, Wilford, and Smalarz (2013) argued 
that this was insufficient—examiners can never be completely shielded from contextual 
information because even a single sample presented alone suggests that there is evidence to 
indicate that this sample is from the true culprit. Instead, Wells and colleagues (2013) asked 
whether contextual bias could be reduced or eliminated in a forensic context with an 
evidence lineup procedure. The current experiment suggests that the answer is yes. When 
people received evidence lineups rather than the standard procedure, people matched the 
crime print to the innocent suspect print 10% of the time on average, whether they received 
contextual information or not. So, there was a 32% reduction in people matching the crime 
print to the innocent suspect when people received an evidence lineup as well as contextual 
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information compared with the standard procedure with no lineup (42% versus 10%). These 
data also indicate that evidence lineups offer a benefit not only when contextual information 
is present, but also outperform the standard procedure even in the absence of additional 
contextual information. Without contextual information, there was a 15% reduction in people 
incorrectly matching the crime print to innocent suspect prints in the filler-control procedure 
compared with the standard procedure (25% versus 10%). 
Furthermore, these results showed identical patterns to those described in the 
eyewitness literature. Generally, showups are characterized by higher innocent suspect 
identifications, but lower choosing rates than lineups. Eyewitness lineups result in higher 
choosing rates than showups, but also lower innocent suspect identification rates (Steblay et 
al, 2003). In the current study, there was a higher rate of affirmative match decisions in the 
filler-control procedure (72% in match present, and 58% in match absent trials) compared 
with the standard procedure (65% in match present, and 33.5% in match absent). But in 
match-absent filler-control trials, the majority of these match decisions were filler picks 
(48.5% of the time people selected a filler; see Table 2). Therefore, only 9.5% of the time 
people selected the innocent suspect in the filler-control procedure compared with 33.5% of 
the time in the standard procedure. This result can be attributed to the eyewitness 
identification filler siphoning mechanism—when no actual match is present, good fillers can 
spread a large share of false positive errors out to the fillers (Wells, Smalarz, & Smith, 2015; 
Wells, Smith, & Smalarz, 2015). But there is a trade-off—the innocent suspect is more 
protected in a lineup, yet there is also a loss in culprit identifications. As is found in 
eyewitness literature, people selected fillers in match-present trials too (27.5% of the time), 
but the observed reduction in hits is smaller than the magnitude of the benefit to the innocent 
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suspect, making lineups the better choice (see Wells, 1993 for a summary of the eyewitness 
literature). Accordingly, there is a benefit of evidence lineups over evidence showups in a 
forensic examination context, just as has been observed in an eyewitness context. Future 
research on evidence lineups can draw on the theory and methods in the eyewitness literature 
to move forward and further explain and develop these findings.  
In addition, the patterns in the confidence judgments were consistent with my 
hypotheses, the underlying theoretical framework of this project, and the other results 
obtained in this study. People were less confident when the materials were more ambiguous, 
indicating that they found the task more difficult, in line with the increase in incorrect 
decisions when the materials were more ambiguous. It also makes theoretical sense that 
contextual bias effects were found in the trials with ambiguous materials only. When the 
information in a bottom-up process is ambiguous and seems to not provide a clear answer, 
people look for other information to help them, such as contextual information, which will 
influence decisions via top-down processing (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Saks et al., 2003). 
People tended to have lower confidence when they use the filler-control procedure, 
indicating that this task maybe also felt more difficult or made people less sure of their 
selection because there were other, plausible options. In fact, the lower confidence is 
probably due to a combination of these factors, given the high number of people deciding 
that a filler was a plausible match. 
But what is the mechanism by which fingerprint lineups reduce the impact of 
contextual information on decision-making? When faced with a single sample, the question 
is whether or not someone is sure that this print resembles the crime print enough to say they 
came from the same person’s finger. When contextual information is available that suggests 
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that a match is likely, people start with an expectation that the prints are likely to match and 
search for evidence of this. This is a different starting point to someone who begins with no 
information to help the decision-maker assess likelihood of guilt—the search for confirming 
and disconfirming evidence is unbalanced and therefore more likely to fall in favor of his or 
her expectation.  
However, as suggested by Wells, Wilford, and Smalarz (2013), even presenting a 
single sample suggests that there is reason to believe this person committed the crime. So, 
whereas I found evidence in this study that the additional information contained in the police 
case report increased innocent suspect match decisions when the task was more difficult, this 
does not mean that there was not some contextual bias occurring with the standard procedure 
in the condition where participants received no contextual information. These data can speak 
to the effect of the additional contextual information and how it increased the likelihood of 
an incorrect match decision when the suspect sample was presented alone. Specifically, 
because the evidence lineups reduced innocent suspect match decisions even when 
comparing the procedures that were absent of contextual information, it is possible that even 
the single sample presentation was having a small contextual bias effect in the standard 
procedure that was removed with the presence of additional filler samples. 
How did the evidence lineups eliminate the contextual bias effect? When faced with 
six plausible samples, one of which may be a match, the decision is now more difficult. Is 
there one that looks more like it matches than the others? If so, then the decision is whether 
that sample is actually a match or just very similar? In addition, people know that if they do 
not do a proper bottom-up analysis there is a five out of six chance that they will pick a filler, 
and they will be incorrect. Even when provided with information suggesting that the suspect 
  
43 
sample should match the crimple sample, they still need to be able to pick out which one is 
the suspect. In the evidence lineups, unless the person can perform the bottom-up processing 
task of identifying the print that matches the crime print, the addition information cannot 
assist them in their decision via top-down processing. Importantly, the filler-control 
procedure is not only a test of the suspect’s guilty, it is also a test of examiners’ abilities to 
perform the task they are trained to do. The task can be failed if the examiner picks a filler, 
feedback that they would get very soon after performing the examination. If an examiner 
cannot perform the fingerprint-matching task proficiently, then they will begin to accumulate 
a high rate of filler picks during the course of their work. 
To illustrate, let’s return to the example of Lana Canen again, introduced at the 
beginning of this paper. If Lana Canen’s print had been embedded in a lineup of six 
fingerprints, the examiner would have needed to pick out her fingerprint before he could use 
the other information he had concerning another man’s confession, which implicated her in 
the crime. As such, if the filler-control procedure had been used in Lana Canan’s case, the 
examiner would have had a five out of six chance of picking a known-innocent filler rather 
than picking Lana’s prints. Furthermore, the examiner would have known that picking a filler 
was a possibility, which might have pushed the examiner into a more conservative decision-
making style and diluted the effect of contextual information. Because her prints did not 
actually match the prints at the crime scene, our data suggest that a procedure where her print 
was presented alone for comparison put her in the most danger of being matched to the crime 
print, especially if other contextual information was available. But, if her print had been 
examined in a fingerprint lineup, that had good fillers, her prints would have had no more of 
a chance of being selected as a match than would the prints of a filler. If one extrapolated 
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from the current data, the chance of Lana’s prints being picked out as matching the crime 
print would have been 32% lower in the filler-control procedure (10% innocent suspect 
match decisions in the filler-control procedure compared with 42% in the standard 
procedure). So, the filler-control procedure might have revealed that the examiner was biased 
in this case. Other reasons that an examiner might pick a filler are that they cannot 
adequately perform the bottom-up task, or are lying about their fingerprint analysis abilities. 
Lana Canen may have avoided 8 years in prison if the filler-control procedure had been used. 
The obvious application for this research is to move this procedure to the field to help 
prevent wrongful convictions, uncover fraudulent or incompetent examiners, and improve the 
quality and independence of forensic evidence in court. It may be that this procedure need 
not be utilized in every case, but it should certainly be used whenever a second opinion is 
required, especially where the previous examiners decision is known, or for high-profile 
cases where contextual information is readily available. In addition, if a police investigator 
wishes to provide the examiner with additional information about the case besides the 
samples themselves, then a filler-control procedure should be used to ensure that this extra 
information does not impact the decision. Finally, this procedure could be used as a way to 
calibrate individual examiners and score the reputation of laboratories. The filler-control 
procedure allows examiners to receive feedback about their performance in real cases, which 
is useful and currently not available. If an examiner makes in incorrect affirmative 
determination, this error might never be discovered or not discovered until many years later 
if the innocent suspect is exonerated. And, as Wells et al. (2013) noted, the frequency with 
which analysts select fillers in real cases can inform the legal system about the competencies 
of individual examiners and the reliability of various techniques based on actual cases 
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submitted to analysis. As such, the filler-control method can provide the legal system with 
the ability to calculate error rates for examiners and their laboratories using the actual cases 
that are submitted to their labs. Therefore, not only can we identify examiners performing 
poorly, but we can also establish a general error rate in fingerprint examination based on the 
actual cases that they are routinely analyzing.  
There are likely to be practical difficulties involved in creating evidence lineups for 
real cases. The selection of fillers would take time and man hours, and there would need to 
be a clear selection strategy in place to ensure that each evidence lineup is fair. Evidence 
lineups would need to be created in a timely fashion to ensure they do not exacerbate the 
backlog that is already an issue in many forensic laboratories. So, before these findings can 
be applied in the real world, they need to be tested further and policy-related questions would 
need to be answered. Who will create the evidence lineups? How will they be created and 
verified as fair? How will this additional task be funded? What forensic materials benefit 
most from evidence lineups and under what situations is it most beneficial to use the filler-
control procedure? For example, fiber analysis is a good example of a evidence material that 
could benefit from the filler-control procedure—if an examiner cannot say with certainly that 
one fiber in the lineup is the same as the fibers associated with a crime, then the examiner 
cannot testify that these fibers are incriminating evidence, but they may corroborate other 
evidence in the case.  
It may be that evidence lineups are not appropriate for routine cases that come 
through a laboratory. But maybe verification evaluations should use evidence lineups to 
weed out incompetent or dishonest examiners, and add another level of protection to the 
innocent suspect. In addition, it would be valuable to require the filler-control procedure to 
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be used for any new forensic techniques. Police investigators are frequently looking for new 
kinds of evidence to present to help secure convictions, so new techniques emerge fairly 
regularly, for example, matching the wear on a pair of jeans to a pair of jeans belonging to 
the suspect. Until examiners for these techniques have demonstrated that they can reliably 
discriminate between fillers and the suspect sample with these new techniques, the filler-
control procedure should be required in all cases. 
It is important to note, also, that our participants were not fingerprint examination 
experts. Whereas studies have shown that laypersons and novice examiners are able to 
distinguish between matching and non-matching prints (Tangen, Thompson, & McCarthy, 
2011; Vokey, Tangen & Cole, 2009), experts show different patterns to novices and 
laypersons. Experts consistently outperform novice examiners, particularly in situations 
where the two fingerprints to be analyzed do not match, but are extremely similar (Experts 
were correct 99.32% of the time and novices only 44.82% of the time). However, when the 
prints do match, or when the prints do not match and are very dissimilar, experts typically 
achieve more than 90% accuracy, and novices between 70 and 80% accuracy (Tangen, 
Thompson, & McCarthy, 2011). Experts do not achieve perfect accuracy, but their error rate 
is much lower than novices. The other significant difference between experts and novices is 
that experts tend to make conservative errors more often, rather than the kinds of errors that 
could lead to wrongful convictions. So, these data suggest that if the current study was run 
with an expert population, the contextual bias effects may be slightly smaller, and the error 
rates in the standard procedure not so high if experts tended to be conservative in their 
evaluations. But, experts will still make these kinds of errors that endanger innocent suspect 
on rare occasions. However, to this day, there has never been a systematic test to obtain an 
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actual measure of the error rate in the field for fingerprint examiners, so whether these 
patterns translate to the field remains to be seen (Busey & Parada, 2010; Cole, 2005). In 
addition, some studies suggest that the technology available to experts now results in an 
increased susceptibility to bias and error in real world cases, such as the use of the large 
AFIS database that is used to find highly similar prints for later examination by forensic 
experts (Dror & Mnookin, 2010; Marcon, 2009). By its very design, AFIS creates very 
ambiguous comparisons for experts to inspect, the circumstances under which contextual bias 
was found in the current study. Although experts tend towards more conservative errors and 
have a smaller error rate, they are not immune to contextual bias effects (Dror et al., 2006), 
so it is anticipated that the filler-control procedure would be beneficial for experts too and 
would still improve their already superior performance. 
Because this finding is novel, the effects should be replicated with fingerprints, as 
well as other forensic materials to determine how generalizable the evidence lineups solution 
is. In addition, we should see if other forms of contextual information produce contextual 
bias in a similar way too. Currently, my laboratory is investigating how having knowledge of 
another person’s determination about the same set of fingerprints can influence people’s own 
match decision. This procedure can be likened to an examiner who knows what another 
examiner concluded. If knowing what another person thought was correct impacts people’s 
decisions, then there should be significantly more decisions that are consistent with the 
previous person’s evaluation. For example, if a participant has information telling them that 
the previous participant determined that the prints matched, then this would create an 
expectation that the prints will match and they should be biased to also find a match. People 
should also make consistent decisions when they believe the previous participant thought the 
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prints did not match, biasing them to determine no match as well. In addition, we are looking 
at the influence of exculpatory information on fingerprint decisions, such as a DNA 
mismatch, or a solid alibi.  
Furthermore, in the real world, experts are allowed to conclude that crime samples are 
not of sufficient quality for them to determine a “match” or “no match”. Therefore, a study 
should be run where participants are also given the option to say that the prints are “not 
suitable for analysis”. Choosing this option would allow a participant, or fingerprint 
examiner, to forgo making a match decision on the grounds that the prints are too degraded 
or ambiguous to decide whether the prints came from the same person who left the print at 
the crime scene. This option may change the pattern of results for lay people, but in the real 
world there may be too much pressure to make a match decision from the police 
investigators. Accordingly, the last goal would be to test the filler-control procedure (with 
and without the “not suitable for analysis option”) with real examiners too. Once data with 
experts has been obtaining, it would be possible to determine the situations in which using 
this procedure would be most efficient.  
Although the filler-control procedure may require some additional resources and 
examiner time, it would be extremely beneficial to the legal system to make use of this to 
improve forensics. Given that there are some practical drawbacks to constructing and 
examining a lineup versus a single sample, future research should find the conditions under 
which contextual bias is most prevalent, and the phases in an investigation when it would be 
most useful to introduce an evidence lineups, such as a second opinion examination or when 
there is a lack of other evidence in the case to corroborate the fingerprint examiners 
conclusion. 
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Figure 1. A graphical representation of the multilevel logistic regression models that used 
binary sample choice variables as the dependent measure, with three predictors, and two 
higher level grouping variables.  
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Figure 2. A graphical representation of the multilevel model used in the analyses with 
participant’s confidence in their decisions as the dependent measure. 
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Table 1. A table summarizing of the number of participants in each between subjects 
condition. 
Between Subjects Group Number of Participants 
Less Ambiguous Materials 116 
More Ambiguous Materials 119 
Standard Procedure without Context 57 
Standard Procedure with Context 53 
Filler-control Procedure without Context 61 
Filler-control Procedure with Context 64 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of the mean proportion of people in each between-subjects condition who 
selected match (suspect or filler) or no match, and the mean confidence for each decision in 
the pilot data. 
Ambiguity Actual 
match 
Selected correct print or 
innocent suspect 
Selected a filler Selected no match 
Proportion Confidence Proportion Confidence Proportion Confidence 
Less 
ambiguous 
materials 
Match 0.50 74% 0.29 65% 0.21 70% 
No Match 0.15 71% 0.54 65% 0.31 70% 
More 
ambiguous 
materials 
Match 0.44 65% 0.25 59% 0.31 60% 
No Match 0.10 66% 0.56 61% 0.34 62% 
Notes. Proportion refers to the number of people in that condition who selected that sample, 
e.g. the innocent suspect when there was no match, for the correct print when there was a 
match. Confidence refers to the average confidence level for that choice e.g. people who 
were in the condition with less ambiguous materials and correctly identified the print that 
matched the crime print were 74% confident in their decision on average. 
 
 
Table 3. A summary of the terminology for the dependent measures in the logistic multilevel 
regression analyses. 
Procedure Match 
Presence 
Match decision – “Choosing” No match decision 
Suspect sample Filler sample 
Standard Match “Hit” 
 
- “Miss” 
No Match “False Alarm” 
 
- “Correct Rejection” 
Filler-
Control 
Match “Hit” “False alarm on a 
filler sample” 
“Miss” 
No Match “False alarm” “False alarm on a 
filler sample” 
“Correct Rejection” 
 
 
  
57 
Table 4. Summary of the mean proportion of people in each between-subjects condition who 
selected match or no match. 
Procedure Context 
present or 
absent 
Actual 
match 
Selected true 
match or 
innocent 
suspect 
Selected 
filler 
Selected no 
match 
Standard No Context Match 0.65 - 0.35 
No Match 0.29 - 0.71 
Context Match 0.65 - 0.35 
No Match 0.38 - 0.62 
Filler 
Control 
No Context Match 0.45 0.25 0.30 
No Match 0.10 0.48 0.42 
Context Match 0.44 0.30 0.26 
No Match 0.09 0.49 0.42 
Notes. Proportion refers to the number of people in that condition who selected that sample, 
e.g. the innocent suspect when there was no match, for the correct print when there was a 
match. 
 
Table 5. Summary of the mean proportion of people in each between-subjects condition who 
selected match or no match, separated by ambiguity condition. 
 Ambiguity 
condition 
Context 
present or 
absent 
Actual 
match 
Selected 
true match 
or innocent 
suspect 
Selected 
filler 
Selected 
no match 
 
 
 
Standard 
Procedure 
Less 
ambiguous 
materials 
No Context Match 0.72 - 0.28 
No Match 0.34 - 0.66 
Context Match 0.72 - 0.26 
No Match 0.34 - 0.66 
More 
ambiguous 
materials 
No Context Match 0.59 - 0.41 
No Match 0.25 - 0.75 
Context Match 0.59 - 0.41 
No Match 0.42 - 0.58 
 
 
Filler- 
Control 
Procedure 
Less 
ambiguous 
materials 
No Context Match 0.44 0.22 0.34 
No Match 0.09 0.48 0.43 
Context Match 0.48 0.31 0.21 
No Match 0.08 0.48 0.44 
More 
ambiguous 
materials 
No Context Match 0.47 0.28 0.25 
No Match 0.10 0.48 0.42 
Context Match 0.40 0.30 0.30 
No Match 0.10 0.50 0.40 
Notes. Proportion refers to the number of people in that condition who selected that sample, 
e.g. the innocent suspect when there was no match, for the correct print when there was a 
match. 
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Table 6. Summary of the mean confidence level of people in each between-subjects condition 
who selected match or no match, separated by procedure and context presence. 
Procedure Context 
present or 
absent 
Actual 
match 
Selected true 
match or 
innocent 
suspect 
Selected 
filler 
Selected no 
match 
Standard No Context Match 72% - 62% 
No Match 67% - 68% 
Context Match 72% - 63% 
No Match 67% - 70% 
Filler 
Control 
No Context Match 74% 60% 63% 
No Match 61% 63% 65% 
Context Match 69% 64% 63% 
No Match 67% 62% 64% 
Notes. Confidence refers to the average confidence level for that choice for that combination 
of between-subjects factors e.g. people who were in the standard procedure condition with no 
context, and also correctly identified the print that matched the crime print were 72% 
confident in their decision on average. 
 
Table 7. Summary of the mean confidence level of people in each between-subjects condition 
who selected match or no match, separated by procedure, ambiguity, and context presence. 
 Ambiguity 
condition 
Context 
present or 
absent 
Actual 
match 
Selected 
true match 
or innocent 
suspect 
Selected 
filler 
Selected 
no match 
 
 
 
Standard 
Procedure 
Less 
ambiguous 
materials 
No Context Match 78% - 68% 
No Match 71% - 78% 
Context Match 73% - 66% 
No Match 67% - 74% 
More 
ambiguous 
materials 
No Context Match 64% - 59% 
No Match 63% - 61% 
Context Match 71% - 61% 
No Match 68% - 67% 
 
 
Filler- 
Control 
Procedure 
Less 
ambiguous 
materials 
No Context Match 76% 62% 72% 
No Match 54% 66% 72% 
Context Match 72% 67% 67% 
No Match 65% 64% 69% 
More 
ambiguous 
materials 
No Context Match 71% 54% 51% 
No Match 67% 59% 57% 
Context Match 64% 61% 61% 
No Match 69% 61% 60% 
Notes. Confidence refers to the average confidence level for that choice for that combination 
of between-subjects factors e.g. people who were in the standard procedure condition with 
less ambiguous materials, and no context, and also correctly identified the print that matched 
the crime print were 78% confident in their decision on average. 
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Table 8. Table comparing the d´ values in each procedure, with and without context, with all 
fingerprint materials, and then separated by ambiguity condition. 
Ambiguity 
Condition 
Procedure Context d´ 
All materials Standard No Context .939 
Context .691 
Filler control No Context 1.156 
Context 1.190 
Less ambiguous Standard No Context .995 
Context .995 
Filler control No Context 1.190 
Context 1.355 
More ambiguous Standard No Context .902 
Context .420 
Filler control No Context 1.206 
Context 1.028 
Notes. D prime = d´. The parameter d´ is not being used as a measure of discriminability, 
rather it is being used as an indication of how much the innocent suspect is incorrectly 
identified relative to correct match decisions. So, lower d´ values indicate more danger of 
incorrect identification of the innocent suspect. 
 
 
Table 9. Table showing the intraclass correlation values (ICC) for Fingerprint Set and 
Participant grouping variables in the current data. 
Notes. All values rounded to 2dp. ICC = intraclass correlation, which is the percentage of 
variation in the outcome variable attributable to the higher-level grouping variable alone. For 
example, an ICC of 0.16 or 16% for “choosing” means that 16% of the variation in 
“choosing” is attributable to the Fingerprint Set grouping variable. 
  
Outcome variable ICC—Fingerprint Set ICC—Participant 
Mean 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Mean 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Choosing 16% [0.11, 0.23] 5% [0.02, 0.08] 
Suspect Choosing 26% [0.20, 0.35] 6% [0.03, 0.09] 
False Alarms 27% [0.20, 0.36] 4% [0.11, 0.07] 
Misses 23% [0.17, 0.31] - - 
Correct Rejections 47% [0.39, 0.57] - - 
Confidence 9% [0.06, 0.14] 39% [0.34, 0.45] 
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Table 10. A summary of the multilevel models assessing contextual bias in the data obtained 
from participants who received the standard procedure and more ambiguous materials. 
Outcome Fixed effect Estimate S.E. z value p value 
Hits Intercept -4.014 1.945 -2.064 0.039 
 Context 0.032 0.301 0.105 0.916 
False Alarms Intercept -4.088 1.434 -2.851 0.004 
 Context Presence 0.769 0.324 2.369 0.018 
Notes. All values rounded to 3 dp. S.E. = Standard Error of the mean. Level 2 grouping 
variables: Participant (N = 234), and Fingerprint Set (N = 64). 
 
 
Table 11. A summary of the two level logistic multilevel model results to assess the affects of 
predictors on each decision type. 
Outcome Fixed effects Estimate S.E. z value p value 
Choosing Intercept -0.779 0.241 -3.228 0.001 
 Match Presence 1.513 0.283 5.352 <.001 
 Procedure Type 1.085 0.281 3.856 <.001 
 Context Presence 0.182 0.169 1.074 0.282 
 Ambiguity Level -0.102 0.229 -0.446 0.656 
 Match x Procedure -0.801 0.393 -2.040 0.041 
 Context x Ambiguity -0.031 0.239 -0.129 0.897 
Hits Intercept -2.916 0.982 -2.970 0.003 
 Procedure Type -0.990 1.556 -0.857 0.392 
 Context Presence 0.032 0.146 0.219 0.827 
 Ambiguity Level -0.434 0.645 -0.672 0.502 
False Alarms Intercept -3.330 0.680 -4.895 <.001 
 Procedure -1.889 0.749 -2.521 0.012 
 Ambiguity -0.075 0.307 -0.246 0.806 
 Context Presence -1.179 0.621 -0.289 0.773 
 Context x Ambiguity 0.609 0.431 1.412 0.158 
Misses Intercept -3.352 0.687 -4.881 <.001 
 Context Presence -0.169 0.160 -1.057 0.291 
 Ambiguity Level 0.203 0.568 0.357 0.721 
 Procedure Type -0.203 0.768 -0.265 0.791 
Correct 
Rejections 
Intercept -3.372 1.004 -3.358 <.001 
Context Presence -0.170 0.174 -0.976 0.329 
Ambiguity Level -0.282 0.576 -0.490 0.624 
 Procedure Type -0.222  1.022 -0.217 0.828 
Notes. All values rounded to 3 dp. S.E. = Standard Error of the mean.  Level 2 grouping 
variables: Participant (N = 234), and Fingerprint Set (N = 64). Goodness of fit (misses): χ2 
(8) = 19.413, p<.0128. Goodness of fit (correct rejections): χ2 (8) = 30.041, p<.001. 
 
  
  
61 
Table 12. A summary of the two level logistic multilevel model results to what predictors 
influence the confidence level participants’ had in their decisions. 
Fixed effect Estimate S.E. df t value p value 
Intercept 8.093 1.059 241.7 7.642 <.001 
Procedure -0.463 0.217 221.4 -2.135 0.034 
Ambiguity -0.902 0.216 223.1 -4.172 <.001 
Notes. All values rounded to 3 dp. S.E. = Standard Error of the mean. Context Type as a 
categorical control variable. Level 2 grouping variables: Participant (N = 234), and 
Fingerprint Set (N = 64). 
 
 
Table 13. A summary of the three way ANOVA with Context Presence, Ambiguity Level, and 
Procedure Type as factors with two levels, and d´ as the outcome variable. 
Subset Parameter F value p value 
Full dataset Context Presence 2.113 .147 
Procedure Type 12.664 <.001 
Ambiguity Level 4.616 0.033 
Context x Procedure 0.545 0.461 
Context x Ambiguity 0.262 0.609 
Procedure x Ambiguity 16.447 <.001 
Three way interaction 0.659 0.418 
More Ambiguous 
Materials only 
Context Presence 2.310 0.131 
Procedure Type 34.661 <.001 
Two way interaction 1.437 0.233 
Less Ambiguous 
Materials only 
Context Presence 0.379 0.539 
Procedure Type 0.106 0.746 
Two way interaction 0.002 0.962 
Notes. All values rounded to 3 dp. Adj. R2 = 0.116. 
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APPENDIX A.  FINGERPRINT SETS 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1. These are materials in the Set 1 fingerprints for the standard procedure, which are 
in the more ambiguous condition. The match is on the left and the no match comparison 
sample is on the right. 
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Figure 2. These are materials in the Set 1 fingerprints for the filler-control procedure, which 
are in the more ambiguous condition. The match is in the top lineups (Sample 2) and the no 
match comparison sample is in the bottom lineup (Sample 2). 
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Figure 3. These are materials in the Set 2 fingerprints for the standard procedure, which are 
in the more ambiguous condition. The match is on the left and the no match comparison 
sample is on the right. 
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Figure 4. These are materials in the Set 2 fingerprints for the filler-control procedure, which 
are in the more ambiguous condition. The match is in the top lineups (Sample 4) and the no 
match comparison sample is in the bottom lineup (Sample 4). 
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Figure 5. These are materials in the Set 3 fingerprints for the standard procedure, which are 
in the less ambiguous condition. The match is on the left and the no match comparison 
sample is on the right. 
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Figure 6. These are materials in the Set 3 fingerprints for the filler-control procedure, which 
are in the less ambiguous condition. The match is in the top lineups (Sample 3) and the no 
match comparison sample is in the bottom lineup (Sample 3). 
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Figure 7. These are materials in the Set 4 fingerprints for the standard procedure, which are 
in the less ambiguous condition. The match is on the left and the no match comparison 
sample is on the right. 
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Figure 8. These are materials in the Set 4 fingerprints for the filler-control procedure, which 
are in the less ambiguous condition. The match is in the top lineups (Sample 6) and the no 
match comparison sample is in the bottom lineup (Sample 6). 
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Figure 9. These are materials in the Set 5 fingerprints for the standard procedure, which are 
in the more ambiguous condition. The match is on the left and the no match comparison 
sample is on the right. 
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Figure 10. These are materials in the Set 5 fingerprints for the filler-control procedure, which 
are in the more ambiguous condition. The match is in the top lineups (Sample 5) and the no 
match comparison sample is in the bottom lineup (Sample 5). 
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Figure 11. These are materials in the Set 6 fingerprints for the standard procedure, which are 
in the more ambiguous condition. The match is on the left and the no match comparison 
sample is on the right. 
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Figure 12. These are materials in the Set 6 fingerprints for the filler-control procedure, which 
are in the more ambiguous condition. The match is in the top lineups (Sample 4) and the no 
match comparison sample is in the bottom lineup (Sample 4). 
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Figure 13. These are materials in the Set 7 fingerprints for the standard procedure, which are 
in the less ambiguous condition. The match is on the left and the no match comparison 
sample is on the right. 
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Figure 14. These are materials in the Set 7 fingerprints for the filler-control procedure, which 
are in the less ambiguous condition. The match is in the top lineups (Sample 2) and the no 
match comparison sample is in the bottom lineup (Sample 2). 
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Figure 15. These are materials in the Set 8 fingerprints for the standard procedure, which are 
in the less ambiguous condition. The match is on the left and the no match comparison 
sample is on the right. 
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Figure 16. These are materials in the Set 8 fingerprints for the filler-control procedure, which 
are in the less ambiguous condition. The match is in the top lineups (Sample 3) and the no 
match comparison sample is in the bottom lineup (Sample 3). 
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Figure 17. These are materials in the Set 9 fingerprints for the standard procedure, which are 
in the more ambiguous condition. The match is on the left and the no match comparison 
sample is on the right. 
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Figure 18. These are materials in the Set 9 fingerprints for the filler-control procedure, which 
are in the more ambiguous condition. The match is in the top lineups (Sample 4) and the no 
match comparison sample is in the bottom lineup (Sample 4). 
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Figure 19. These are materials in the Set 10 fingerprints for the standard procedure, which 
are in the more ambiguous condition. The match is on the left and the no match comparison 
sample is on the right. 
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Figure 20. These are materials in the Set 10 fingerprints for the filler-control procedure, 
which are in the more ambiguous condition. The match is in the top lineups (Sample 6) and 
the no match comparison sample is in the bottom lineup (Sample 6). 
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Figure 21. These are materials in the Set 11 fingerprints for the standard procedure, which 
are in the less ambiguous condition. The match is on the left and the no match comparison 
sample is on the right. 
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Figure 22. These are materials in the Set 11 fingerprints for the filler-control procedure, 
which are in the less ambiguous condition. The match is in the top lineups (Sample 1) and the 
no match comparison sample is in the bottom lineup (Sample 1). 
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Figure 23. These are materials in the Set 12 fingerprints for the standard procedure, which 
are in the less ambiguous condition. The match is on the left and the no match comparison 
sample is on the right. 
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Figure 24. These are materials in the Set 12 fingerprints for the filler-control procedure, 
which are in the less ambiguous condition. The match is in the top lineups (Sample 5) and the 
no match comparison sample is in the bottom lineup (Sample 5). 
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Figure 25. These are materials in the Set 13 fingerprints for the standard procedure, which 
are in the more ambiguous condition. The match is on the left and the no match comparison 
sample is on the right. 
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Figure 26. These are materials in the Set 13 fingerprints for the filler-control procedure, 
which are in the more ambiguous condition. The match is in the top lineups (Sample 4) and 
the no match comparison sample is in the bottom lineup (Sample 4). 
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Figure 27. These are materials in the Set 14 fingerprints for the standard procedure, which 
are in the more ambiguous condition. The match is on the left and the no match comparison 
sample is on the right. 
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Figure 28. These are materials in the Set 14 fingerprints for the filler-control procedure, 
which are in the more ambiguous condition. The match is in the top lineups (Sample 3) and 
the no match comparison sample is in the bottom lineup (Sample 3). 
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Figure 29. These are materials in the Set 15 fingerprints for the standard procedure, which 
are in the less ambiguous condition. The match is on the left and the no match comparison 
sample is on the right. 
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Figure 30. These are materials in the Set 15 fingerprints for the filler-control procedure, 
which are in the less ambiguous condition. The match is in the top lineups (Sample 4) and the 
no match comparison sample is in the bottom lineup (Sample 4). 
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Figure 31. These are materials in the Set 16 fingerprints for the standard procedure, which 
are in the less ambiguous condition. The match is on the left and the no match comparison 
sample is on the right. 
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Figure 32. These are materials in the Set 16 fingerprints for the filler-control procedure, 
which are in the less ambiguous condition. The match is in the top lineups (Sample 3) and the 
no match comparison sample is in the bottom lineup (Sample 3). 
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APPENDIX B.  INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 Instructions given to participants in the standard procedure: 
  
“You will receive eight folders from eight different criminal cases. 
 
Each folder will contain all the materials you will need for your analysis. 
 
For each case there will be a fingerprint that was lifted from the crime scene. 
 
In addition to the print lifted from the crime scene, there will be one other fingerprint labeled 
“Comparison sample”. 
 
The comparison sample is the suspect. Keep in mind that the suspect might or might not be 
the culprit – that is what you are trying to help determine. 
 
Your task, for each case, is to decide if the comparison print matches the one from the crime 
scene.” 
 
Instructions given to participants in the filler-control procedure: 
 
“You will receive eight folders from eight different criminal cases. 
 
Each folder will contain all the materials you will need for your analysis. 
 
For each case there will be a fingerprint that was lifted from the crime scene. 
 
In addition to the print lifted from the crime scene, there will be six other fingerprints labeled 
“Sample 1”, “Sample 2” and so on. 
 
Only one of the six sample prints is from someone who is the suspect in that case. For 
comparison purposes, the other five prints are from people who we know did not commit the 
crime in question. You are not told which of the six prints is from the suspect. Keep in mind 
that the suspect might or might not be the culprit – that is what you are trying to help 
determine. 
 
Your task, for each of the eight cases, is to decide if any one of those six prints matches the 
one from the crime scene and, if so, which one matches.” 
  
Additional instructions for those in the Context-present condition: 
 
“You will also receive a police case report containing details and some background of each 
case to help with your decision.” 
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APPENDIX C.  CONTEXTUAL BIAS MATERIALS 
 
  
Figure 33. Contextual information in the form of a mock police case report describing 
incriminating information relating to a kidnapping. 
  
96 
 
Figure 34. Contextual information in the form of a police case report describing 
incriminating information relating to a rape/sexual assault. 
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Figure 35. Contextual information in the form of a police case report describing 
incriminating information relating to an extortion case. 
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Figure 36. Contextual information in the form of a police case report describing 
incriminating information relating to a bomb threat. 
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Figure 37. Contextual information in the form of a police case report describing 
incriminating information relating to an arson case. 
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Figure 38. Contextual information in the form of a police case report describing 
incriminating information relating to an identity theft case. 
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Figure 39. Contextual information in the form of a police case report describing 
incriminating information relating to a homicide. 
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Figure 40. Contextual information in the form of a police case report describing 
incriminating information relating to an armed robbery. 
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APPENDIX D.  IRB ETHICS APPROVAL 
  
 
